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1.1 Introduction
Policy making regarding public utilities and industries of public interest is nowadays
extensively delegated to an "independent regulator", generally a corporate body, independent
by the control of the government. Examples of independent regulators are Ofgem (the Office
of the Gas and Electricity Markets) and Ofcom (the Office of Telecommunications) in the
UK, and the NRC (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) in the US. The main reasons for
establishing independent regulators is to protect the consumers from the effects of imperfect
competition and to insulate the policy decision making regarding a sector of public interest
from other government objectives, such as revenue raising and redistribution. Most of the
independent regulators have decision powers; for example, in the case of natural monopolies,
they can decide upon the level of a price or a price cap, while the US NCR can set safety
standards to protect public health on agents who use nuclear material or operate nuclear
facilities.
In contrast, in environmental policy, pollution targets and therefore the level of
pollution taxes and other instruments are exclusively decided by the federal or the local
governments (for example, either by the Congress or by individual states in the US, and by
the European Commission or by national governments in Europe).
Recent years have seen the establishment of environmental protection agencies like
the EPA in the US, the Environment Agency in the UK, and the European Environmental
Agency in the EU. They, however, have very little decision power, mostly conducting
environmental policing (e.g. ensuring that government standards are met). The agencies can
indeed propose environmental policy or advice the government, however, they have no
monopoly right to making proposals, so effectively a government is not bound to translate
1into law any agency proposal. An agency with no decision or proposal power ultimately may
have little or no influence regarding environmental policy.
An important issue is whether the role of environmental protection agencies should
move beyond the present advisory-policing role. In particular if they should be given more
powers in line with a "truly" independent regulator, i.e. the power to decide the level of
environmental standards and taxes.
In our paper we wish to address the following questions: Should environmental policy
be decided upon by an "independent regulator" for environmental policy or by the government
(in Congress or Parliament) together with other policy instruments? And, what are the
consequences for environmental policy and economic growth?
1.2 The Literature
More generally, in designing political institutions it is important to have an understanding of
the political process, i.e. how policy proposals are made and how individuals would vote.
One way to model the political process is to use the median-voter framework. Within
this approach, either one has analysed direct democracies, where individuals vote on a single-
dimensional policy variable (e.g. Meltzer and Richard (1981), Persson and Tabellini (1994a),
and for environmental policy, Eriksson and Persson (2003), McAusland (2003)), or one has
analysed "median dictatorships," where the single person who gets most votes implement her
preferred policy (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1994b), Renström (1996), and for environmental
policy, Marsiliani and Renström (2000), (2004)). The two approaches do not give different
predictions if one restricts to one-dimensional policy variables (unless there is a time-
inconsistency problem present, Persson and Tabellini (1994b)). The latter approach has the
advantage that several policy instruments may be analysed, but typically only if individuals
2differ in one dimension. However, those models are highly stylised in modelling political
decision making, and little can be said about constitutional design (other than restricting
voting rights).
1 For example, in addressing our question, having independent regulator would
not change anything in the median-voter model. In political equilibrium, the elected individual
taking the environmental policy decision would be of the same type that takes the decisions
on the remaining policy instruments! It is not the median-voter model itself which is
"problematic." Rather it is the restriction to agents differing only in one dimension. After all,
we should expect such neutrality in a one-dimensional world.
An alternative to the median-voter models is the citizen-candidate model (Besley and
Coate (1997), and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)). Also there, there is one individual who gets
her ideal point (most preferred policy). Furthermore, when individuals differ in several
dimensions, there may be several equilibria, and little can be said about policy. Therefore,
many applications of citizen candidate models involve economies with individuals of no more
than two types. In the latter case, we should expect neutrality with respect to constitutional
design.
2
Recently a literature has evolved trying to carefully model different political processes,
especially trying to handle multidimensional situations. A number of papers have tried to
explore this issue, in particular Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1998), (2000), and Persson
and Tabellini (1999). Common to those models is the way in which legislators reach an
1 Of course one can investigate other restrictions on government policy making in this class of models.
Restrictions on policy may be desirable if there is a time-inconsistency problem. An example is the tax-
earmarking restriction proposed in Marsiliani and Renström (2000).
2 A different approach to elections is to view voters and the government as a principal-agent relationship. Here
voters set reservation utilities for re-electing a government. The government is re-elected if it delivers the
reservation utility for the majority. This endows the polititian with less freedom than in the citizen-candidate
model (if the polititian wishes to be re-elected). See List and Sturm (2004) for application to environmental
policy.
3agreement: legislative bargaining (as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). The (randomly) selected
legislator makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the others. Characteristic about those models
are that a winning policy proposal is some individual’s ideal point (i.e. most preferred
proposal). This implies that the winning policy is "confiscatory" in the sense that it leaves
some individuals with no consumption at all.
Finally, for environmental economics a very popular political-economy model is the
lobbying model (see Aidt (1998), Fredriksson (1997), Johal and Ulph (2002)). Within that
framework it is not clear how to handle elections. An attempt was done by Besley and Coate
(2001). They found while introducing elections, strategic voting neutralised the effect of
lobbying. For our question we think elections are important. Because, if there is neutrality
with respect to separation of powers, it probably comes from elections. So if we can find non-
neutrality, and we still allow for elections (and strategic voting) we have a strong result.
1.3 Our Approach
In order to address our question we should take care of potentially many effects that arise as
a consequences of constitutional changes. For example, lifting out the environmental
dimension in parliament alters all other policy decisions in parliament. Voters would realise
this and vote in such a way that the composition in parliament would be altered. Furthermore,
the identity of the regulator cannot be assumed. The way in which the regulator is chosen
may affect the equilibrium.
To capture these effects, we introduce a micro-founded political institution
(parliament). We also introduce an underlying economy, where individuals make choices over
time, and where the second-best tax system is present. We use an overlapping-generations
economy where individuals differ in their tax bases (due to differences in age) and in their
4preferences over the environment. In our economy the policy instruments are: labour, capital
and environmental taxes, a public production input and a public good. There will be a conflict
of interest when choosing the environmental tax. A higher tax reduces production and less can
be spent on private consumption and public consumption. Since individuals value the
environment differently they will generally disagree. There will also be a conflict of interest
over which tax base to tax more (labour or capital). Since individuals differ along two
dimensions (age and preferences) and policy is multidimensional (four dimensions) we will
in general not have a Condorcet winning policy quadruple. We overcome this problem by
model policy through (micro-founded) parliamentary decision making. We then make a
constitutional experiment and investigate the equilibrium under separation of powers
(independent regulator).
Our baseline institution is a parliament, which is modelled differently from the existing
literature on legislatures (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and in particular (2004)).
3 We
assume that policy proposals can be negotiated upon.
4 We also introduce a further stage in
endogenising the composition of the legislature through voting. This is important since the
composition of the legislature cannot be invariant with respect to constitutional comparisons.
When comparing political systems one cannot assume that the elected representatives are the
same under each of the systems. For example, if a certain system allocates more power to
some individuals than in another system, then the electorate ought to vote strategically to
offset some of this difference. We should therefore expect equivalence of political systems
3 The common feature of those models is the way in which legislators reach an agreement through legislative
bargaining (as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). A randomly selected legislator makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal
to the others. Characteristic about those models are that a winning policy proposal is some individual’s ideal
point (i.e. most preferred proposal). This implies that the winning policy is "confiscatory" in the sense that it
leaves some individuals with no consumption at all.
4 Besley and Coate (1998) also use a bargaining model of this kind.
5to a larger extent.
We use the model of the parliament to investigate whether environmental policy
should be taken by an independent regulator or in the parliament and the consequences for
pollution and economic growth. We find, even though the electorate offset the difference to
some degree, and a system with an independent regulator gives rise to lower pollution, but
at the same time it causes the parliament to adopt a productively inefficient policy, contrary
to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). The reason is not that the voters try to offset the
environmental policy (though they do) but the coalition in parliament is trying to do it.
Furthermore, if there is population growth (so the pivotal voter is young) then separation of
power leads to higher growth. On the other hand if there is population decline, so the pivotal
is old, then growth is lower under separation of powers. This is a striking result, since if
countries differ in their constitutional arrangements, one can observe tough environmental
policy and high economic growth go hand in hand! One should not draw the conclusion that
tougher environmental policy causes growth (the relationship is just due to differences in
constitutions).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the overlapping-generations
economy is introduced and the economic equilibrium is solved for. Section 3 outlines the
constitution, and analyses bargaining, coalition formation, and the political equilibrium under
the bench mark constitution. Section 4 introduces an independent regulator and analyses the
consequences for the equilibrium in the parliament.
2. THE ECONOMY
Individuals live for two periods, consuming both as young and as old, but work only when
young. They have preferences over period-one consumption, period-two consumption, period-
6one and period-two provision of public goods and period one and two pollution externalities.
Individuals within each age group differ in preferences over pollution. For simplicity we
assume that they are of two types. In period one individual i born at t supplies one unit of
labour (inelastically) on the market and consume ct
it units of the only consumption good.
5 She
is paid ω t per unit of supplied labour and she saves k
it
t+1 for the next period. Let τ t
l and τ t
k
denote the wage-income tax rate and the capital-income tax rate respectively. It is convenient
to define the after-tax prices as Pt≡ (1-τ t
k)Rt and ω t≡ (1-τ t
l)wt. In period two she receives after-
tax return, Pt+1, on her savings all of which is used for consumption c
it
t+1. Per-capita




The size of generation t is denoted Nt, and grows (declines) at a constant rate n >(<) 0.
Within each generation individuals are endowed with either low taste, θ
l, or high taste, θ
h, for
the environment. The fraction of total population endowed with low (=no) taste for the
environment (θ
l=0) is denoted γ , and is constant over time. Furthermore, we assume β /(1+β )>
θ
h/(1+θ
h)>β µ(1+ε )/[(1+β )α ].
A2 Individual Preferences
For analytical tractability the utility function is assumed to be of the form
5 For the preferences we are going to work with (Cobb-Douglas), nothing changes if labour supply was elastic.
The income and substitution effects on labour would cancel, and labour supply would just be a constant
(provided the after-tax wage is positive).
7where the parameters β , ε , and θ
i are strictly positive.
(1)
A3 Individuals’ Constraints




Production is a function of capital, labour, and pollution (which is taxed by the government),
as well as a productivity enhancing factor, Zt, provided by the government. We assume
congestion in this factor so only its per-capita level, zt=Zt/Nt, augments productivity. This








I Bench mark constitution
Economic policy at time t (the tax rates (τ t
l, τ t
k, τ t
k) and the public production input,
Zt, and consequently the public goods level) is determined by majority vote in parliament. A
proposal may be worked out by one party if in majority, or by negotiations among two or
more parties in parliament, if no single party has majority. Only the party with most seats
may choose coalition partner(s), and only once. If no proposal is worked out, parliament
dissolves and there is no government for one period. Each individual type may constitute a
party, and members are only of the same type. Individual citizens vote on parties that
participate in the election. Prior to the voting stage parties decide whether to enter (costlessly)
or not. The number of seats obtained in parliament is proportional to the number of votes.
II Separation of powers (independent regulator)
As bench mark constitution, except that prior to coalition formation in parliament, a
regulator is majority elected in parliament. The regulator takes the decision on the
environmental tax prior to the parliamentary coalition works out the policy proposal on the
remaining variables.
2.2 Economic Equilibrium
In this section the individual and aggregate economic behaviour are solved for, given any
arbitrary sequences of tax rates and public expenditure.
By profit maximisation the before-tax prices (the interest rate and the wage rate) are
given by
(6) (7)
9respectively, and the pollution level is chosen to satisfy
where (9)
(8)
Maximisation of (1) subject to (2)-(3) gives the individuals’ decision rules
(10) (11) (12)
and indirect utility (up to a multiplicative constant)
An old individual’s indirect utility is
(13)






We view political institutions as rules under which policy decisions are taken. We now outline
two set of rules: The bench-mark constitution (where all policy decisions are taken in
parliament) and Separation of Powers (where the environmental tax decision is taken by an
independent regulator, and the other policies in the parliament).
The sequence of events under the bench-mark constitution is as follows:
1. Entry of parties (individuals can register parties containing members of their own type
only).
2. Electorate vote (each individual casting one vote on a party of her choice), and parties are
represented proportionally to the number of votes.
3. Coalition formation in parliament (largest party chooses coalition partner, rationally
anticipating the bargaining outcome). Coalition partner can only be chosen once.
4. Bargaining in the coalition takes place (with threat points of parliament dissolving for one
period).
5. Policy formed by a majority coalition is implemented.
For separation of powers we modify the sequence of events as follows:
1. Entry of parties.
2. Electorate vote (still proportional representation).
3. Environmental regulator is chosen (through a vote in parliament).
4. Environmental regulator decides on the environmental tax.
5. Coalition formation in parliament.
6. Bargaining in the coalition (over the remaining policy instruments).
117. Policy formed by a majority coalition is implemented.
Once individuals have been elected for parliament, they have to form a group and present a
policy proposal supported by more than one half of the elected members. Contrary to the
legislative bargaining literature, were a chosen legislator makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal,
we assume that both sides have a say. We model the proposal as a solution to Nash
bargaining, with weights proportional to the number of seats. We can view this as each person
within the coalition enters with the same weight, and since each person of the same group is
the same, this is equivalent to the group getting a weight proportional to the number of
seats.
6 A political equilibrium is defined as follows:
(i) Given any voting outcome, and thereby given any composition of parties in
parliament, the largest party must find the choice of coalition partner(s) optimal, rationally
anticipating the Nash bargaining solution (with weights proportional to the size of the party
and threat points equal to the utilities in case of no government) for each possible coalition
that contains a majority of members of parliament.
(ii) Given the parties that have chosen to run for election, and rationally anticipating
the coalition to form, an individual must find her choice of party to vote for optimal, given
everybody else’s vote, knowing that she marginally affect the bargaining outcome by
marginally changing the size of the parties.
7
6 This can also be rationalised by thinking of an alternating-offer bargaining game, where the person to make
an offer is chosen randomly within the coalition, and there is a finite time where the game must end. If one
group is larger, the probability that a person from this group is chosen to make an offer is also larger. Then, in
equilibrium of this game, the larger group gets a larger "share of the cake." Also, if nobody has accepted an offer
before the last round, the person who can make an offer last will make an offer who leaves the opponent at her
reservation utility (i.e. the utility if the parliament dissolves). Therefore the threatpoints will matter in a similar
way as in the Nash bargaining solution.
7 An equilibrium to the voting game is a Nash equilibrium.
12(iii) Members of a party (that is a group of people of the same type) must find the
entry decision (that is run or not to run for election) optimal, given the other three parties
entry decisions.
8,9
(i), (ii), and (iii) must be mutually consistent.
The equilibrium concept tells us how to solve for the political equilibria. First we characterise
the bargaining outcome between various parties. Next we examine which coalitions can form.
Given each possible coalition we check whether it is consistent with a Nash equilibrium in
the voting game, where voters anticipate the coalition to form. Finally we check whether the
entry decisions constitute a Nash equilibrium in the entry game.
In the two dimensional model (age and taste heterogeneity) there are two kinds of equilibria
(which one occurs depend on the underlying parameter values). One type of equilibrium is
when a single party has majority and does not have to form a coalition at all. This happens
when the difference in the taste parameter is small so that the model is close to one
dimensional (only age heterogeneity becomes relevant). Then if the young (old) are the largest
age group, they will also have single majority in parliament. Policy then becomes the ideal
point of one individual and effectively collapses to the median-voter model. These equilibria
are of less interest for conducting constitutional experiments. We ill instead in this paper
focus on the coalition equilibria (when no single party has majority). This involves restrictions
on the underlying parameters of the model (see Renström 2002).
8 An equilibrium to the entry game is a Nash equilibrium.
9 In explicitly considering an entry stage, we borrow from the citizen-candidate literature (Besley and Coate
(1997), Osborne and Slivinski (1996)).
13A particular feature of the model is that the only coalitions that can form (consistent with
rational voting) is across preferences and across age. We will therefore only examine the
bargaining allocations for those coalitions.
A further feature is that the coalitional equilibrium policy is a compromise (on the
contract curve between two individuals). The voters of the same types as the coalition partners
have a dominant strategy to vote on themselves (to pull the compromise closer the their ideal
points). This implies that one of the groups that are not represented in the coalition must, in
equilibrium, be indifferent in altering the relative coalition size. We call this group the pivotal
voter. If the pivotal group was not indifferent, they would vote on their own age group (as
everybody else) and the largest age group would have single majority and the coalition would
not be formed. It is necessary that one group is indifferent in altering the relative coalition
size (and will vote in mixed strategies), i.e. it is necessary that the pivotal voter exist.
We will proceed as follows. First solving for the bargaining allocation as function of
the relative bargaining power (relative coalition size). Then finding the relative bargaining
power that maximises the utility of the individual group not represented in the coalition (i.e.
the pivotal voter). This pins down the equilibrium.
3.2 Bargaining
We will only consider equilibrium coalitions. Those are between young and old, and where
young and old differ in their preferences over the environment.
Let the young group have pollution preferences θ
i, and the old θ
j. Let the relative size
of the young in the coalition be ρ , and the consequently the old’s relative size is 1-ρ . The
default options are specified as the utilities if the parliament is dissolved, and consequently
there are no public goods, nor taxes in that period (this gives zero utility for both). The Nash
14maximand is
(17)
A young individual must realise that the current wage tax will affect the savings, and hence
the capital stock in the next period. This will potentially affect the next period’s political-
equilibrium policies: τ
k
t+1, gt+1, and xt+1. We have to treat these as functions of kt+1. We guess
those functional forms, then solve the Nash maximand, and lastly verify that the guesses were
correct. It turns out that τ
k
t+1 and xt+1 are independent of the future capital stock (and
consequently independent of the current wage tax) and that ln gt+1 = constant + ln (1-τ
l
t)+l n
yt. Taking the logarithm of the Nash maximand, substituting away the after tax prices by
using (6) and (7), and substituting for gt+1, we may write the problem as
s.t. (8), (9), (15), and (16).
(18)
Solving gives:
Proposition 1 Assume A1-A6, and that a group consisting of young i-types form a coalition
with a group consisting of old j-types, then the bargaining-solution policy is as follows
(19)
(20)




otherwise η is a function of the pollution tax as follows
(24)
Proof: See Appendix A.
(25)
The solution gives linear sharing rules (after tax incomes are linear fractions of GDP). This
is intuitive because of the Cobb-Douglas utility specification. The share depends on the
relative weight a group carries in the bargaining. Equations (19) and (20) give the tax rates
applied to the two generations. It is rather obvious that the larger the young are in relation
to the old (i.e. the larger ρ ) the lower will the labour tax be. The opposite for the capital tax.
The provision of zt, in the bench-mark constitution is according to the production-efficiency
level (a constant 1-α of GDP). This is not surprising since Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)
production efficiency holds in the second best. However, when the environmental tax cannot
be set in the coalition, there is a potential deviation from production efficiency. The reason
is that the coalition is deprived of one instrument (i.e. the pollution tax). It will turn out that
there will be production inefficiency under separation of powers. The reason is that the
16regulator uses the pollution tax to reduce pollution in excess of what the coalition would have
done. The coalition uses zt to partially undo this. Furthermore, the pivotal voter will try to
partially unto this effect (but not totally) by voting strategically.
3.3 Pivotal Voter
We will now identify the pivotal voter, i.e. the group outside the coalition that is indifferent
(in equilibrium) in altering the relative coalition size. This group is picking their most
preferred point on the contract curve between the two coalition partners. If a pivotal voter
did not exist, it would imply that agents vote on their own age group, and the largest age
group would have majority without forming the coalition. Thus, the pivotal voter is necessary
for a coalitional equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A6, and that a group consisting of young i-types form a coalition
with a group consisting of old j-types, then individuals with low preference for the
environment that are not included in the coalition, vote for the individual in the coalition of
their own age group.
The pivotal voter is young (old) with high preference for the environment if i-types
have low (high) preference, and j-types high (low) preference.
Proof: See Appendix A.
If preferences over the environment are distant enough (according to the condition in
Assumption 1) then we have a situation where the young (or old) outside the coalition may
or may not favour their own age group in the coalition. For example if θ
h is sufficiently larger
17than θ
l, then there is an ideal relative coalition size (between young θ
l and old θ
h) preferred
by the young θ
h outside the coalition (i.e. the pivotal voter). Thus, if such a coalition were
to form the young θ
h have no incentive to try to maximise the size of the young θ
l or of the
old θ
h. In fact, there is a relative coalition size which makes the outside group indifferent in
altering the relative powers of the partners inside the coalition. Similarly, there is an ideal
relative coalition size (between young θ
h and old θ





l are too close (Assumption 1 prevents this), then any individual outside the
coalition will prefer to increase the size of their own age group. The political equilibrium then
reduces to a median-voter equilibrium, with the largest age group dictating policy (and
consequently confiscating from the minority age group). This is plausible since when one
dimension of heterogeneity disappears (θ ), there is only one dimension left (age), and with
one dimensional heterogeneity, logically, the model should collapse to a median-voter model.
3.4 Coalition Equilibrium
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A6, and that population growth is positive. Then the coalitional
equilibrium is characterised by a coalition of young θ
l and old θ
h.
Three parties enter: young θ
l, young θ
h, and old θ
h. All old individuals vote for old θ
h. The
pivotal voter is young with θ
h and vote in mixed strategies on the three parties, being
indifferent altering the relative coalition size.
Proof: Suppose there was a coalition across age groups but with same environmental
preferences. Then all agents have an incentive to vote on their own age group. Then the
18young θ
i would have majority and the coalition would not form, which is a contradiction. The
same argument hold for coalitions within age groups. Finally consider the mirror image of
the coalition above: old θ
l and young θ
h. Then by proposition 2 the pivotal voter is old,
implying that all young vote young θ
h. But then the young θ
h obtain majority without forming
the coalition. The coalition above is the only one consistent with rational voting when n>0.
QED
Proposition 4 Assume A1-A6, and that population growth is negative. Then the coalitional
equilibrium is characterised by a coalition of young θ
h and old θ
l.
Three parties enter: old θ
l, old θ
h, and young θ
h. All young individuals vote for young θ
h. The
pivotal voter is old with θ
h and vote in mixed strategies on the three parties, being indifferent
altering the relative coalition size.
Proof: See proof of Proposition 3.
The main intuition for the equilibria above is as follows. If population growth is positive the
young are in majority (by age). There is then a possibility that the old will get their income
confiscated. By entering as one party (as old θ
h), all old votes are concentrated on one party.
Whenever there is a possibility that young θ
l can enter in a coalition with the old, they are
better off running separately, and splitting the votes of the young. This, at the same time,
makes a single young party not in majority. The same holds the other way around when
population declines.
4 COMPARATIVE POLITICS
4.1 Election of regulator and regulator’s behaviour
19Proposition 5 Assume A1-A6. If population growth is positive (negative), then the majority
elected (in parliament) regulator is young (old) with high preferences for the environment,
that is, of the same type as the pivotal voter.
Proof: The regulator coincides with the median in parliament.
Proposition 6 Assume A1-A6. For a given coalition and a given coalition size, an old
regulator implements lower pollution level, and as a result the coalition provides more of the
public production factor.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuition is that an old individual cares more for the environment than a young. The
reason is that a young wishes to transfer consumption possibilities to the next period. By
polluting a bit more, there is more production which can be saved for the next period.
When an old individual seeks to implement less pollution (by increasing the environmental
tax) the coalition counteracts, by trying to increase pollution again. This is done by providing
more of the public production factor which is a complement to pollution.
4.2 Behaviour of the coalition
Proposition 7 Assume A1-A6. An independent regulator causes, through the counteracting
behaviour of the coalition, a higher level of the public production factor than is prescribed
by production efficiency (whether or not the pivotal voter counteracts).
20Proof: See Appendix B.
A regulator (regardless if young or old) cares more about the environment than the "coalition
preferences." When the regulator increases the environmental tax, the coalition provides the
public production factor at a level higher than productively efficient.
4.3 Behaviour of voters
Proposition 8 Assume A1-A6. Under separation of powers (independent regulator) a young
pivotal voter provides a larger fraction of votes for the young (low θ ) than under the bench-
mark constitution. An old pivotal voter provides a larger fraction of votes for the old (low θ )
than under the bench mark.
Proof: See Appendix B.
This result implies that a pivotal voter counteracts by changing her vote fractions. The pivotal
provides more votes to the less environmentally friendly. This is in order to offset the attempt
by the regulator to legislate a tougher environmental policy. This shows that the composition
in the parliament are different under different constitutions.
If one tries to design a constitution, giving more power to certain groups, this may be (at least
partially) offset by strategic voting.
Proposition 9 Assume A1-A6. Under separation of powers (independent regulator) pollution
is at a lower level than under the bench-mark constitution.
21Proof: See Appendix B.
This result implies that the pivotal voter only partially offset the environmental regulator’s
attempt to reduce pollution. Separation of powers reduces pollution, but at the cost of
production inefficiency.
Proposition 10 Assume A1-A6. If population growth is positive, so that the young is pivotal,
then GDP growth is greater under separation of powers (independent regulator) than under
the bench-mark constitution. If population growth is negative, so that the old is pivotal, then
GDP growth is lower under separation of powers (independent regulator) than under the
bench-mark constitution.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Economic growth is affected by the constitutions in various ways. First, any constitution
giving greater power to the young (higher ρ ) reduces the wage tax and increases the savings
(and thereby the growth rate). This happens when young are pivotal and we go to separation
of powers. However, separation of powers implies less pollution, and therefore less production
and less savings. Next, an increase in the public production factor above 1-α is not
productively efficient. However, the overall effect is to increase growth, as Proposition 10
says. When old are pivotal, separation of powers will reduce the power of the young so the
savings effect via the tax on the young works the other way, so growth is lower.
225. CONCLUSIONS
The paper develops a political-economy model to analyse whether decisions upon
environmental policy should be taken by a parliament or an independent regulator.
The underlying economy is an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals
differ in preferences over the environment (as well as in age). Labour taxation, capital
taxation, and pollution taxation is used to finance public goods provision, period by period,
as well as a public production factor. Economic growth is generated by the public production
factor.
As a contribution to the literature, we have carefully modelled a political system
(parliament) and underlined the consequences for growth in addition to pollution of changing
constitutions. The legislature is modelled as a parliament. Individuals may form parties, and
the electorate vote on the parties that have decided to run for election. The number of seats
obtained by a party in parliament is proportional to the number of votes it gets. Given the
election result parties form coalitions to bargain over policy proposals. The implemented
proposal is the one getting more than half of the votes in parliament.
We have compared two constitutions: (I) a bench-mark case where all policy decisions
(including environmental) are taken in parliament, (II) a case of separation of powers, where
the parliament elects a regulator, who in turn sets environmental policy independently. To
summarise, we found the following main results:
Table 1 - Pollution and growth effects in relation to bench-mark constitution
separation of powers
pollution growth
pop. growth > 0 lower higher
pop. growth < 0 lower lower
23We found that a system with an independent regulator gives rise to lower pollution, but at the
same time it causes the parliament to adopt a productively inefficient policy. The reason is
not that the voters try to offset the environmental policy (though they do) but the coalition
in parliament is trying to do it. Furthermore, if there is population growth (so the pivotal voter
is young) then separation of power leads to higher growth. On the other hand if there is
population decline, so that the pivotal is old, then growth is lower under separation of powers.
This is a striking result, since if countries differ in their constitutional arrangements, one can
observe tough environmental policy and high economic growth go hand in hand! One should
not draw the conclusion that tougher environmental policy causes growth (the relationship is
just due to differences in constitutions).
One can think of alternative constitutional arrangements.
10 One when the regulator is
appointed by the largest party in parliament (i.e. by the government). The largest party has
an incentive to appoint someone of the same type as themselves. Therefore, the regulator
would be of the opposite age group as the pivotal voter (instead of the same type as the
pivotal voter as was the case in our paper). This will expectedly lead to a greater conflict
between the pivotal voter and the regulator, which may lead the pivotal voter to counteract,
through strategic voting, even more than was the case in our paper. Another constitutional
arrangement is when the voters elect the regulator. We may need further parametric
restrictions on the model to ensure that there is a Condorcet winner in choosing the regulator.
The reason is that there are four groups in the electorate, differing in two dimensions. We
leave this for future work.
10 A recent literature (see Besley and Coate, 2003, for a review) claims that there is indeed a difference in the
policy outcomes depending on whether the regulator is appointed or elected by voters. They suggest that elected
regulators tend to be more consumer-oriented, while the appointed ones seem to be more prone to regulatory
capture. Their theory is supported by empirical evidence for the US electricity industry (Besley and Coate, 2000).
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26APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1
The first-order conditions are
Inserting those into (16) and substituting into (15) gives
(A.1)
(A.2)
When all decisions are taken in the legislature we optimise with respect to zt and xt as well
(A.3)
(this is equivalent to optimising with respect to zt and τ
x
t).
Using (15) to substitute away π tyt gives
(A.4)
Substituting for gt by using (A.3) gives
(A.5)
Substituting this into (A.3) gives (21) when η =1-α . Next
(A.6)
by using (15) to substitute away π tyt we obtain
(A.7)
Use (A.5) to substitute for zt/gt then (22) is obtained for η =1-α . Finally using (21) in (A1) and
(A.8)
27(A2) gives (19) and (20) for η =1-α .
When τ
x
t is taken as given (i.e. when it is chosen by an independent regulator) then
zt and xt cannot be independently chosen in the legislature. We proceed as follows. Pollution’s
marginal product is equal to the environmental tax
Use (8) to substitute for xt and rearrange to obtain
(A.9)









Finally, use η =zt/yt in (A.10) to obtain
Next, by (8) we have xt=µyt/τ
x




this into (22) gives (25). QED
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Preliminaries
We first derive indirect utilities as functions of the relative bargaining powers and potentially
choice of η . Substitute zt=η yt into equation (9) and rearrange to obtain
The indirect utility (excluding constants) of a young individual is
(B.1)
where the second line follows from ln gt+1 = constants + ln yt+1 = constants + ln kt+1 =
(B2)
constants + ln ω t, the third line from the definition of ω t, the fourth line from the equations
for 1-τ
l
t and gt/yt, and the last line by using (B.1).
Similarly, the indirect utility (excluding constants) of an old individual is
(B.3)
Proof of Proposition 2
Under the bench-mark constitution η =1-α and is constant. Differentiating (B.2) with respect
to ρ gives
29and similarly for an old individual (equation (B.3))
(B.4)




j=0 shows that the first-order variation is
(B.5)
positive. Young individuals with low preferences for the environment have a dominant





i=0 shows that there is an interior solution. In particular, as ρ =0
marginal utility is plus infinite, and as ρ =1 marginal utility is minus infinite.




i=0 shows that the first-order
variation is negative. Old individuals with low preferences for the environment have a





j=0 shows that there is an interior solution. In particular, as ρ =0
marginal utility is plus infinite, and as ρ =1 marginal utility is minus infinite. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
In characterising the preferences of an environmental regulator, we can use (B.2) and (B.3).
The regulator takes the parliamentary composition as given (i.e. takes ρ as fixed). Instead of
maximising with respect to the environmental tax we can use the relation (25) and maximise
with respect to η instead.
Substituting for the derivative of (22) with respect to η gives
(B.6)
This gives η as a function of ρ . Taking the derivative of the first-order condition with respect
(B.7)
to ρ gives us the sign of the derivative of η with respect to ρ (because the derivative of the
first-order condition with respect to η is negative by the second-order condition). Notice that
30ρ enters only through xt. By (22) we see that xt is increasing in ρ (decreasing) if (1+β )θ
j >
(<) θ
i. Consequently we have
Notice that this also holds if there is an old environmental regulator in office. The first-order
(B.8)
condition is the same as (B.7) except for the 1+β terms. In particular
The first-order conditions would look the same if θ
y=(1+β )θ
o>θ
o. This means that an old
(B.9)
regulator (everything else equal) would implement a higher η . By inspection of (22) there is
a negative relationship between xt and η . Consequently, everything else equal, an old regulator
implements stricter environmental policy. QED
Proof of Proposition 7
In characterising the preferences of a pivotal voter, we can use (B.2) and (B.3). When the
regulator is of the same type as the pivotal voter we can use the envelope condition. In the
total derivative
we can ignore the partial with respect to η . Thus we have the same derivatives as in (B.4)
(B.10)




i=0. Then (B.4) implies that the term
in square brackets is negative. This is the same term as in the square brackets in (B.7). For
(B.7) to be zero, the very first term must be negative. Therefore η >1-α , so the environmental
regulator induces the coalition to oversupply the public production factor.




j=0. Then (B.5) implies that the
term in square brackets is negative. This is the same term as in the square brackets in (B.9).
For (B.9) to be zero, the very first term must be negative. Therefore η >1-α , so also an old
environmental regulator induces the coalition to oversupply the public production factor.
Notice that this conclusion holds regardless if the pivotal voter tries to counteract a higher η
or not. QED
31Proof of Proposition 8
We will now prove the results on the pivotal voter’s strategic behaviour. Equations (B.4) and
(B.5) give the pivotal’s (young and old, respectively) voting behaviour as a function of η .
Since this is a first-order condition, taking the derivative with respect to η gives the sign of
the derivative of ρ with respect to η . Notice that η enters only through xt (which is decreasing
in η , for given ρ ). The term -Ntθ xt is multiplied by (1+β )θ
j - θ
i. Consequently the first-order
variations are increasing in η if (1+β )θ
j - θ
i > 0, that is




i=0, then ρ is larger for larger η . When it is
(B.11)
known that the regulator is setting the environmental tax (and thereby inducing the coalition
to choose a larger η ) the pivotal voter chooses to devote a larger fraction of votes to the
young individuals with no preference for the environment, thus counteracting.




j=0, then ρ is smaller for larger
η . When it is known that the regulator is setting the environmental tax (and thereby inducing
the coalition to choose a larger η ) the pivotal voter chooses to devote a larger fraction of
votes to the old individuals with no preference for the environment, thus counteracting. QED
Proof of Proposition 9
The total effect on pollution is found as follows. Equations (B.4) and (B.5) give total




i=0, gives ∂ xt/∂ρ < 0. Since
ρ is higher (than under the bench-mark constitution) pollution is lower. This implies that the
young pivotal only partially counteracts, so equilibrium pollution is lower under separation




j=0, gives ∂ xt/∂ρ > 0. Since ρ is lower (than
under the bench-mark constitution) pollution is lower. This implies that the old pivotal only
partially counteracts, so equilibrium pollution is lower under separation of powers. QED
32Proof of Proposition 10
Combining B.4 and B.7 to substitute for the term in square brackets, and doing the same with






respectively. Substitute (11) lagged one period into (B.1), use the definition of ω , then
(B.15)
Take logs and use (19)
(B.16)




33When young is pivotal, take the partial derivative of (22) with respect to ρ , insert into (B.19)
(B.19)
and evaluate at θ
j=θ
h, θ
i=0, and substitute (B.14) into (B.19). This gives
Proposition 8 implies that a young pivotal increases ρ , and consequently increases the growth
(B.20)
rate. This is relative to the bench-mark constitution.




By Proposition 8, we have dη /dρ <0. Then by (B.15) (1-µ)η
2>1-α , implying that the term
(B.21)
immediately in front of dη /dρ in (B.21) is negative, so this term is positive.




derivative is negative, however the term in front µ-α is negative, so this term is also positive.
Consequently the growth rate is increasing in ρ . Next, Proposition 8 implies that an old
pivotal lowers ρ , i.e. lowering the growth rate. Again, relative to the bench-mark
constitution. QED
34